UPON LEADING QUESTIONS.

been numerous, both in regard to railways, and the furniture and
equipment of railways, and some of which have already been determined by our courts in favor of the equitable right of the mortgagees, without seeming to comprehend very fully the equitable
grounds upon which they may be made to stand. See ,lso Hart
vs. Farmers' and 1Meclhanies' Bank, 33 Vt. R. 252; Pennock vs.
Coe, 23 Howard U. S. Rep. 117, where Mr. Justice NELSON and
the counsel in argument go into an exhaustive examination and
discussion of this question in all its bearings, and the learned judge
arrives at the same just conclusion, substantially, with that already
indicated as being reached by the House of Lords.
I. F. R.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of the United AStates-_Deember Term, 1862.
TIIE CITY OF CHICAGO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V8. ALLEN ROBBINS.
A., being the owner of real estate situated upon a street in a city, contracted
with B. to erect a building thereon, which included an excavation of the sidewalk adjoining, so as to furnish light and air to the basement. Other contractors were employed to furnish gratings and flagging. Excavations in the
sidewalk of a dangerous character were made by the contractor in the course
of the work, to which the attention of A. was called by the city authorities.
The city knew of the excavation of this and similar areas, and interposed no
objection, though no express permission to make this one was given. While this
condition of things continued, C. fell into the unprotected aiea and was injured.
le brought an action against the city to recover damages. A. had knowledge
of the pendency of the action, but he was not expressly notified to defend it;
nor was he informed that the city would look to him for indemnity. A judgment
was recovered against the city, which it was compelled to pay. In an action
brought by the city against A., to be reimbursed the amount which it had paid
udler the judgment, IIeld,
1. Assuming that C. was injured through the fault of A., and that the city was
not a wrongdoer, A. is concluded by the judgment recovered against the city.
No express notice to him of the pendency of the action was necessary. It is
enough that he knew it was pending, and could have defended it.
2. The excavation, though not a nuisance in itself, became such on account of the
improper manner in which it was made. The city is not, however, for that
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reason a wrongdoer, in such a sense as to lose its right of action against A. No
license from the city to leave the area open and unguarded can be presumed.
3 The defendant was under an obligation to have the work done in such a way as
to save the city from damage and the public from harm. He cannot escape
liability by letting out the work to a contractor. The work having been done
in such a manner as to render the city liable in the first instance, the defendant
is answerable to it for the amount Wrhich it was compelled to pay.
4. The case of Hilliardvs. Richardson, 3 Gray 349, distinguished, and the case of
Scammon vs. The City of Chicago, 25 Illinois 424, so far as it conflicts with these
principles, overruled.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.
-ElliottAnthony, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
S.. T. Puller,for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action on the case brought by the City of Chicago
against Robbins. The suit was originally commenced in the Cook
County Court of Common Pleas, one of the State Courts of Illinois.
It was transferred, in pursuance of the Act of Congress, on the petition of Robbins that he was a citizen of New York, to the Circuit
Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois,
where there was a trial by jury on the 10th day of April, 1860, on
the plea of not guilty, and the issue found for Robbins. There
was a motion for a new trial, which was overruled by the Court, and
on the 28th day of May, 1860, judgment was entered on the verdict
of the jury. The decision of Circuit Courts on motion for new trials
is not subject to review, and this case is here on exceptions taken
to the charge of the judge to the jury.
The declaration alleges: That the plaintiff is a corporition by
the laws of Illinois, having exclusive control over the public streets,
and bound to protect them from encroachment and injury. That
Robbins was the owner of a lot on one of the public strebts, and
wrongfully excavated in thesidewalk next to and adjoining his lot,
an area of great length, width, and depth, and wrongfully suffered
the same to remain uncovered and unguarded, so that one William
H Woodbury, on the night of the 28th of December, 1856, while
exercising reasonable care and prudence in passing along the street,
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fell into it and was greatly injured. That Woodbury brought suit
against the city, in said Cook County Court of Common Pleas, and
at. the June term, 1857, of the said Court recovered a judgment for
$15,000 and costs, which the city has been forced to pay, and that
although the city is primarily liable, yet Robbins is responsible
over to it for the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs so recovered. The case as shown by the bill of exceptions is this: Robbins,
owning a lot in Chicago, on the south-east corner of Wells and South
Water streets, on the 20th of February, 1856, contracted in writing
with Peter Button to erect abuilding thereon, which included an excavation of the sidewalk next to and adjoining it, so as to furnish
light and air to the basement. The contract contained a stipulation that Button was to be liable for any violation of city ordinances
in obstructing streets or sidewalks, or accidents resulting from the
same. Possession of the ground, in order to erect the building,
was given to Button, by the terms of the contract, on the 1st day
of April, 1856. The area was dug early in the pring and covered
up temporarily with joists, which often got displaced, and during the
sumnier and fall it was frequently uncovered and dangerous. The
flagging was laid some time in the fall and the iron gratings afterwards, with which Button had nothing to do.
There were seven different contractors on the building, in all,
on different parts of the work. Letts had the contract for the
iron gratings, and Cook & Co. for the flagging. Robbins was in
Chicago, and occasionally at the building, during the summer, and
was there while excavations were going on, and was spoken to frequently by the city superintendent upon the dangerous condition
of the area. At one time after the flagging was laid, and ice was
or had been on the flagging, lie called Robbins's attention to the
condition of the area, and suggested the mode in which it should be
covered up, "telling him that if it was sleety and people were passing rapidly they might slip in, and that somebody's neck would
be broken if the covering was not attended to," and he replied
"that he would see to it, but that the matter was in the hands of
his contractor, and he would speak to him about it." Before this,
the head clerk in the office of the city superintendent wrote Robbins
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a note and put it in the post office, notifying him of the danger of
the whole front of the sidewalk. The area was usually entirely
open after the flagging was laid, until after the grating was all done,
and was open until after the accident. There were lamps at bridges,
and a lamp at alley, sixty-four feet from the building. The width
of sidewalk, including area, was sixteen feet. The area was four
feet ten inches wide. The grade of Wells street was changed by
the corporation; the sidewalk was raised eight inches higher than
%itwas, to accommodate it to the grade of the street ; it was raised
in July or August, 1856, and Robbins directed Van Osdell, his
architect, to raise the sidewalk to the grade. Van Osdell superintended the erection of the building for Robbins, who paid him;
his duty as superintendent was to see "that the work was done
according to contract; to see that the work and material were
according to specification, and make estimates." Button was told
of the dangerous condition of the area, and spoke several times to
his foreman about it. 'Button was to finish his work under the contract by the 1st of September, but did not in fact complete it until
February, 1857. On the night of the 26th of December, 1856,
the area was not sufficiently covered, and Woodbury fell into it and
was injured, and sued the city and recovered in manner as stated
in the declaration. Marsh was city attorney in 1856, and when the
suit was begun he made preparations for its defence, and ascertaining that Robbins owned the building, applied to him to assist him
in procuring testimony; Robbins told him of a witness who knew
something of the suit, and promised to write to him, and afterwards
informed Marsh that he had done so ; the evening before the trial
he casually met Robbins, and told him that the suit would be tried
the next day; he did not go expressly to notify him to defend the
suit, and never notified him that the city would look to him for indemnity. Evidence was given tending to show that the city authorities knew of the excavation of this area and of other areas similar
to this at different times, aid interposed no objection, though no
express permission to make this one was given.
The defendant introduced in evidence the following provision of
the ordinances of the city of Chicago, viz. :
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CHIATEnR LIIM, SECTION 1.
"ARTICLE II-OnsTRUCMiONS.
,be it ordained by the Common Council of the City of. Chicago, That no porch,
galley, stoop, steps, cellar-door, stair-railing, or platform, erected or to be erected
within the city, shall be allowed to extend into or upon any sidewalk where the
street is less than seventy feet in width, more than four feet; nor more than five
feet, where the street is seventy feet and upwards in width. Any violation hereof
shall sulject the offender to a penalty of twenty-five dollars, and to the like penalty for every day such violation shall continue, after notice from the marshal or
street commissioner of the proper division to remove the same."

It also appeared in evidence that the original ordinance from
which the foregoing provision is taken, was passed May 3d, 1855.
but, as then passed, did not allow of more than four feet encroachment upon the sidewalk in any case. On the 7th of February,
1856, the ordinance was amended by the City Council to read as
above.
Is Robbins, under the law and evidence, answerable over to the
city for the judgment recovered by Woodbury ?
It is well settled that a municipal corporation having the exclusive care and control of the streets, is obliged to see that they are
kept safe for the passage of persons and property, and to abate all
nuisances that might prove dangerous; and if this plain duty is
neglected, and any one is injured, it is liable for the damages sustained. The corporation has, however, a remedy over against the
party that is in fault, and has so used the streets as to produce the
injury, unless it was also a wrongdoer. If it was through the fault
of Robbins that Woodbury was injured, he is concluded by the
judgment recovered, if he knew that the suit was pending and
could have defended it.
=An express notice to him to defend the suit Was not necessary
in order to charge his liability: Barney vs. Dewey, 13 Johns. 226;
Warner vs. HcGany, 4 Vt. 500; Beers vs. Pinney, 12 Wend
309.
He knew that the case was in Court; was told of the day of
trial; was applied to to assist in procuring testimony, and wrote to
a witness, and is as much chargeable with notice as if he had been
directly told that he could contest Woodbury's right to recover, and
that the city would look to him for indemnity.
Robbins is not, however, estopped from showing that he was
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under no obligation to keep the street in a safe condition, and that
it was not through his fault the accident happened. It is insisted
that inasmuch as Robbins had no express permission from the city
to encroach on the street, that he was engaged in an unlawful
work, and the digging of the area was* in itself a nuisance. So
far as the city impliedly could give authority to make this area, it
was given; the corporation undoubtedly knew that this area was in
process of construction, and that many similar ones had been
built since the grade of the city was raised, and yet no objection
was ever interposed. Areas, like the one in controversy, are convenient to the owners of adjoining buildings, and useful in affording light and air, and if during their construction they are properly guarded and protected, they are no essential hindrance to the
public in their right of transit over the streets. The public have
a right to the free passage of the streets, and yet that right cannot always be enjoyed. Improvements could not be made in a
large city; houses could not be built, or repaired even, without the
streets being at some time obstructed. In Commonwealth vs. Passmore, 1 S. & R. 217, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania say:
"It is true that necessity justifies actions which would otherwise
be nuisances. It is true also that this necessity need not be absolute; it is enough if it be reasonable. No man has a right to
throw wood or stone into the street at pleasure. But inasmuch as
fuel is necessary, a man may throw wood into the street for the
purpose of having it carried to his house, and it may lie there a
reasonable time. So, because building is necessary, stones, bricks,
lime, sand, and other materials may be placed in the street, provided
it be done in the most convenient manner." "1But these encroachments on a street must be reasonable, not continued longer than is
necessary, and must be properly guarded and protected so as to
secure the public against danger; and if these things do not concur, then they become nuisances, and can be abated :" Clark vs.
Fry, 8 Ohio R. 359
Was the building of this area a necessary encroachment on the
street; and if so, were the proper steps taken to secure it so as to
protect the public from injury? The fact that an improvement
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may become dangerous, and involves great hazard, is no argument
against the propriety of making it. If, by great care and more
than ordinary diligence, it can be made, and the public saved from
harm, and it is also necessary, then the right to make it ig solved.
The grade of the city was doubtless raised to secure light and air
to basements, to get good cellars, and for purposes of drainage.
The value of property in a city is much enhanced by the erection
of solid and durable buildings, and every proper facility to perfect
them should be given to builders. If it is necessary, in order to
make a better building, to occupy the sidewalk and dig'an area,
and it can be occupied, and the area dug and secured without danger
to the public, then the encroachment made on the street is reason.
able, and the work lawful. But in every improvement like the one
we are considering, it is essential that every.possible precaution
should be used against danger. No precaution whatever was used
in this case. The area was left uncovered, without guards and
lights to warn those who passed by, and a serious accident was the
result. If an area is left open it is dangerous and is a nuisance,
and can be abated: Dygett vs. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446 ; Congreve
vs. Morgan J- Smith, 18 N. Y. 84; Storrs vs. 0 ity of Utica, 17
Id. 108; Coupland vs. Hardingham, 3 Campbell 398.
The city must be reimbursed, unless it has been itself in fault.
The rule of law is, that one of two joint wrongdoers, cannot have
contribution from the other. It is difficult in this case to see how
the city was to blame, and least of all how Robbins can impute
blame to it. Robbins desired to erect a large storehouse, and, to
add to its convenience, wished to excavate the earth in the sidewalk
in front of his lot. Without express permission from the city, but
under an implied license, lie makes the area. No license can be
presumed from the city to leave the area open and unguarded even
for a single nigh t. The privilege extended to Robbins was for his
benefit alone, and the city derived no advantage from it, except
incidentally. Robbins impliedly agreed with the city, that if he
was permitted to dig the area, for his own benefit, that he-would
do it in such a manner as to save the public from danger, and the
city from harm. And he cannot now say, that true it is you gave
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me permission to make the area, but you neglected your duty in
not directing me how to make it, and in not protecting it when in
a dangerous condition. If this should be the law, there would be
an end to all liability over to municipal corporations, and their
rights would have to be determined by a different rule of decision
from the rights of private persons. Because the city is liable primarily to a sufferer by the insecure state "of the streets, offers no
reason why the person who permits or continues a nuisance at'or
near his premises should not pay the city for his wrongful act. The
city gave no permission to Robbins to create a nuisance. It gave
him permission to do a lawful and necessary work for his own convenience and benefit, and if,
in the progress of the work, its original
character was lost, and it became unlawful, the city is not in fault.
We can see no justice or propriety in the rule, that would hold the
city under obligation to supervise the building of an area such as
this.
But the defendant maintains "that the owner of a lot who employs a competent and skilful contractor (exercising an independent
employment) to erect a building on his lot, is not liable to third
persons for injuries happening to them by reason of the negligence
of such contractor in the prosecution of the work," and that this
area was not such a nuisance as rendered him liable. How far
owners of real estate or personal property are answerable for
injuries which arise in carrying into execution that which they
have employed others to do, has been a subject much discussed in
England and this country since the case of Bush vs. Steinman, 1
Bos. & Pul. 404. All the cases recognise fully the liability of
the principal where the relation of master and servant or principal
and agent exists ; but there is a conflict of authority in fiking the
proper degree of responsibility where an independent contractor
intervenes. We are not disposed to question the correctness of the
rule contended for by the defendant as an abstract proposition. The
rule itself has, however, limitations and exceptions, and we cannot
see that it is applicable to this case.
"If the owner of real estate suffer a nuisance to be created or
continued by another on or adjacent to his premises, in a prosecu-
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tion of a business for his benefit, when he has the power to prevent
or abate the nuisance, he is liable for an injury resulting therefrom to third persons:" Clark vs. Try, 8 Ohio R. 359; Ellis vs.
Sheffield Gas Consumers' Company, 2 E. & B. (75 E. 0. L. R.)
767.
This area when it was begun was a lawful work, and if properly
cared for it would always have been lawful; but it was suffered to
remain uncovered,,and thereby became a nuisance, and the owner
of the lot for whose benefit it is made is responsible. He cannot
escape liability by letting work out like this to a contractor, and
shift responsibility on to him if an accident occurs. He cannot
even refrain from directing his contractor in the execution of the
work so as to avoid making the nuisance. A hole cannot be dug
in the sidewalk of a large city, and left without guards and lights
at night, without great danger to life and limb; and he who orders
it dug, and makes no provision for its safety, is chargeable, if injury
is suffered.
It is said that Robbins did not reserve control over the mode and
manner of doing the work, and is not therefore liable; but the digging this area necessarily resulted in a nuisance-was the result of
the work itself-unless due care was taken to make the area safe.
This is a clear case of "doing unlawfully what might be done
lawfully; digging earth in a street without taking proper steps for
protecting from injury :" _Newton vs. Bllis, 5 Di. & B. (85 E. 0. L.
R.) 123.
"If the owner of real estate builds an area in front of his store,
he must at his peril see that the street is as safe as if the area had
not been built :" Congreve vs. Morgan Sinih, 18 N. Y. 84.
The privilege of making the area was a special favor conceded
to Robbins alone, as the owner of the lot, and "it is a familiar
principle that when one enjoys a privilege in consideration that lie
alone can enjoy the benefit, lie is required to use extraordinary care
in the exercise of that privilege :" .AYelson vs. Go(frey, 12 Illinois 20.
Robbins, in the exercise of his privilege, did not use even ordinary care. There is no provision in his contract with Button, nor
with the men who laid the flagging or put on the iron grating, that
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they should provide proper lights and guards. What Button failed
to do, by which he is chargeable with negligence, does not appear
in the evidence. And Robbins, although repeatedly warned, and
having daily supervision over the work by his architect and superintendent, suffers this nuisance to be continued. A case of grosser
negligence could hardly be imagined. In the heart of a large city,
the owner of a valuable lot, being desirous" of adding to the value
of a large iron building that he is about to erect by the license (to
be inferred, not expressed) of the corporation, digs an area; leaves
it open, without guards or lights ; fails to provide with his contractor
for the very matter which, if left undone, would make it a nuisance;
is told of the dangerous condition of the area; has a direct supervision over it by his superintendent, and yet, when an injury is
suffered by the very nuisance which he has created for his own
benefit, and continued, insists that he is not in fault; that if blame
attaches anywhere, it is to his contractor. If the owner of
fixed property is not responsible in such a case as this, it would be
difficult ever to charge him with responsibility.
In the cases which were cited by the defendant's counsel, and
relied on, was the case of .Hilliard vs. Richardson, 3 Gray 849,
and the case of Scammon et al. vs. The City of Chicago, 25 Illinois 424.
Hilliardvs. Richardson was a most elaborate and able discussion
of the doctrine of respondeat suyerior, and the authorities in this
country and England were fully reviewed, and we see no reason to
question the conclusion at which the court arrived. But that case
and the one at bar were not at all alike. That was a case where
the owner of a building contracted with a carpenter at an agreed
sum to repair it, and a teamster, who was employed by the carpenter
to haul boards, left them in the street in front of the lot, and an
accident happened. The teamster, when he placed boards in the
street, was engaged in a work collateral to that which the'owner
contracted for-the repair of the building-and in no sense can
the injury be said to happen from the doing of that defectively
which the owner directed to be done. The owner was correctly not
held liable, and one of the grounds on which that court place their
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decision was, "that it was not a nuisance erected by the owner of
the land, or by his license, to the injury of another."
The case of Scammon vs. The City of Chicago is similar in many
of its facts to this case, and is decided differently. That Court
held, as we do, that if the "nuisance necessarily occurs in the ordinary mode of doing the work the occupant or owner is liable,
but if it is from the negligence of the contractor or his servants,
then he should alone be responsible." But the court also held that
"1the omission to cover the opening in the area did not necessarily
occur as an incident to the prosecution of the work," a rule to which
we cannot assent, and which we think is opposed by reason and
authority.
It was urged at the bar that this Court in such cases follows the
decision of the local courts. W"here rules of property in a State
are fully settled by a series of adjudications, this Court adopts the
decisions of the State Courts. But where private rights are to be
determined by the application of common law rules alone, this
Court, although entertaining for State tribunals the highest respect,
does not feel bound by their decisions. Testing the question of
the correctness of the charge of the judge of the Circuit Court to
the jury by the rules and principles we have discussed and established, was there or not error in it ?
The following language was used by the judge inhis'charge, and
was excepted to by the city. "If, then, the contractors were in
possession and control of the premises with their servants and agents,
and were, in their employment, independent of the defendant at the
time of the accident, and the defendant was not concerned personally
in the negligence which caused it, it follows, from what has been
said, that he could not be held responsible for it." This instruction, in a case where the facts warranted, might have been properly
given. But it did not arise out of the facts of this case; was inapplicable to them; was calculated to confuse and mislead the jury
on the question of Robbins's liability: and must have misled them,
and should not have been given. A broad rule was laid down, when
the very case itself furnished an exception. Robbins's duty was
ubsolute to see that the area, dug under his direction and for his
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benefit, should be safely and securely guarded, and failing to do
so, his liability attached, and the jury should have been told so.
The city also excepted to so much of the said charge of the Court,
as leaves the question of joint negligence on the part of the plaintiff and defendant to the jury. The city was not in fault, and thie
exception was properly taken.
The judgment below is rever~ed, with instructions to
award a venire de izovo.

Supreme Court of illinois.
JAMES B. GORTON, APPELLANT, VS. JOHN M. BROWN, APPELLEE.
An action on the case will not lie for improperly causing a writ of injunction t.
be issued. The remedy is on the injunction bond.
The case of Cox vs. Taylors Administrators, 10 B. Monroe 17, not recognised as
authority.

This was an action of trespass on the case. The declaration
charges, that the appellant, on the 30th day of October, 1854, falsely,
maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause wlatsoever, filed his bill of complaint on the chancery side of the Lake
Circuit Court, and at the same time falsely, maliciously, and without
any reasonable or probable cause whatever, caused to be issued out
of, and under the seal of said court upon said bill, and the indorsement of the master in chancery of said county thereon, a writ of
injunction against and to the said appellee, Brown, whereby he,
the said Brown, was restrained and enjoined from selling, or in any
way or manner disposing of, or interfering with a certain lot uf
lumber which was in said injunction alleged to be owned by said

Brown and Gorton as partners. Also enjoining said Brown from
collected any debts due on account of any of said lumlcr which
had been sold on credit ; wiiel said injunction was, on or about the
day of the issue thereof, served on said Brown.
Declaration also charged, that at and before time of filing said
bill, said Brown was engaged in the lumber trade. That he had
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a cash capital of $2000 in his said business, and a good credit.
That the quantity of lumber which lie was so enjoined from selling
or interfering with, amounted to 100,000 feet of best quality of
pine lumber, worth then in the market, $35 per thousand.
That after the issuing and service of said injunction, such pr6ceedings were had in said chancery suit, in said court, as that said
injunction was, on the 7th day of August, 1856, unconditionally
dissolved by said court ; and that at the September term of said
court, 1851, said bill was, by said Gorton, dismissed at his own
costs.
That said Gorton, at the time of filing said bill and obtaining
said injunction, knew that he was not a copartner or joint owner
with said Brown in said lumber. That by reason of the commencement of said suit, and procuring and service of said injunction,
and the retaining of said injunction from the time of the service
up to the time of the dissolution thereof, said Brown was greatly
injured, and wholly ruined, in his credit and reputation, and lost
the benefit of the sale of his said lumber during the time the said
injunction was in force; and said lumber, while the sale thereof
was so enjoined, became greatly damaged, rotted, and spoiled, so
that at the time of the dissolution of said writ, the same could not
be sold in the market for so much per thousand feet into $10 or
$15. And that he, said Brown, was also compelled to expend large
sums, to wit, $500, in employing counsel to defend said chancery
suit, and obtain the dissolution of said writ.
To this declaration Gorton pleaded1st. The general issue.
2d. That said cause of action did not accrue within two years
preceding the commencement of said suit.
Issue was joined on both of these pleas. And the cause was
tried at the October term, 1860, of the Circuit Court of Cook
county, before IANnpnRn, Judge, and a jury. There was a ;er,lict and judgment for the plaintiff below for two thousand dollars.
On the part of Brown, the plaintiff below, the court gave the
jury, among others, the following instructions :
3. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant
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wilfully and maliciously commenced said chancery suit, and caused
said writ of injunction to be issued and served, he not being at the
time the copartner of the plaintiff, nor having reasonable or probable grounds for believing that he was jointly interested with him
ifi the lumber, then the law is for the plaintiff; and in estimating
the plaintiff's damages, the jury are not confined to the exact amount
in dollars and cents proven by the plaintiff, but may give such
damages as they believe, from the evidence, in view of all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff has sustained, by
reason of the commencement of said suit, and the issuing and service of said writ of injunction.
4. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant
was not, at the time that he commenced said chancery suit, and the
issuing and service of said writ of injunction, the copartner of
said plaintiff, or jointly interested with him as alleged in his bill,
and had no reason or probable ground for believing that he was,
and commenced said cause maliciously, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as the jury believe from the evidence
he has sustained, by reason of the issuing of said writ, and the service thereof, and commencement of said chancery suit; and in estimating such damages the jury will consider the condition, as
shown by the evidence, of the 1imber at the time of the service of
said writ, as well as its condition at the time of dissolution of said
injunction, and allow such damages, by reason of the injury thereto,
as they believe, from the evidence, was sustained by the plaintiff by
reason thereof.
5. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff was
engaged in the lumber business in Waukegan, prior to and after
the time of the commencement of said chancery suit, and issuing
and service of said writ of injunction, and had prior thereto established a business and business credit in said lumber trade, and
that the defendant, knowing that fact, for the purpose of destroying said business and business credit, commenced a chancery suit
against said plaintiff, charging a copartnership to exist between them,
or a joint interest in said property, and caused a writ of injunction
to be issued and served on said plaintiff and his property, without
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probable cause for believing that a partnership existed, for the purpose aforesaid, and that by means thereof said business and credit
were injured, then the law is for the plaintiff; and the jury, estimating the plaintiff's damages, are not confined to the exact amount
in dollars and cents as shown by the evidence, but may give such
damages in addition thereto as they believe, from a just view of
the whole case as detailed in evidence, the plaintiff has sustained.
The defendant thereupon requested the court to instruct the
jury, among other things, as follows :
6. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that Gorton in good
faith supposed himself to be a part owner of the lumber mentioned
in the injunction described in plaintiff's declaration in this case,
and obtained said writ of injunction for the purpose of protecting
what he believed to be his equitable rights, then he had probable
cause for commencing said suit and obtaining said writ of injuno
tion, and this action cannot be maintained.
8. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that at the time of
filing the bill and suing out the writ of injunction mentioned in the
plaintiff's declaration,'the defendant Gorton believed in good faith
that the allegations in said bill were true, and that he was entitled
to the relief therein sought, then he had probable cause for his
said action, and this suit cannot be maintained.
Which said instructions the court refused to give a§ asked, but
modified the sixth instruction, by inserting, after the word -faith"
in second line, the words " and without wilful ignorance," and by
striking out the words "he had probable cause," and inserting in
their place the words cthis action," in the place .of the words so
stricken out, and also by striking out the words " and this action,"
after the word injunction.
And modified said eighth instruction, by inserting after the
words - good faith," the words ,and without wilful ignorance,"
and also by striking out the words "he had probable cause for his
said action," after the word "cthen," in the last clause of said instruction.
11. If the the jury believe, from the evidence in this case, that
the bill was filed and injunction obtained and served in said plain-
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tiff's declaration mentioned, more than two years before the commencement of this suit, then this suit is barred by the Statute of
Limitations, and the law is for the defendant.
12. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the writ of injunction in the plaintiff's declaration mentioned, was dissolved by
the court more than 'two years before thQ commencement of this
suit, then this suit is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and the
plaintiff cannot recover.
Which said last two instructions the court refused to give.
Motions for new trial and in arrest, were overruled, on condition that Brown kemit five hundred dollars from verdict, which
having been done, judgment was rendered on the verdict.
Blodgett & Upton, for appellant.
IV. S. Searles, for appellee.
BREESE, J.-Preliminary to all other questions presented by
this record, is the question, can this action be maintained ? We
have searched the precedents and books of pleadings from the
earliest times to the present, and find but one case where it has
been held, that an action can be maintained for maliciously suing
out a writ of injunction. We are well aware that elementary writers and respectable courts have held that an action on the case
will lie for an abuse of the process of the courts, where special
damages are alleged, and against a party for prosecuting a causeless
action prompted by malice, by which the defendant has sustained some
injury, for which he has no other recourse or remedy. Such actions, however, for the most part, are actions wherein arrests have
been made and bail demanded, or the party put to some other exnense and inconvenience, which cannot be compensated in any other
mode than by an action. Such actions, except where a malicious arrest is charged, are not favdred by the courts, and ought not to be,
for, in a litigious community, every successful defendant would bring
his action for a malicious prosecution, and the dockets of the courts
would be crowded with such suits. Even for instituting a criminal
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prose-cution, and failing in it, courts regard a subequent action for
malicious prosecution with disfavor, for the reason that they have
a tendency to discourage just prosecutions for crime. There is
Hittle doubt that very many aggravated cases of crime have not
been prosecuted, from the dread, in the event of an acquittal, of this
action to follow, and damages recovered, ruinous to the prosecutor.
But the action will lie, for it is reasonable, that when an injury is done
:o a person, either in reputation, property, credit, or in his profession
-r trade, he ought to have an action of some kind to repair himself.
Mlost of the cases we have examined are cases for falsely, maliciously, and without probable cause, suing out process, regular and
legal in form, to arrest and imprison another. Such arrest is tortious and unlawful, and the party causing it ought to be answerable
"indamages for the wrong done, but even in such case, some damage
must be alleged and proved.
As we have said, we have found but one ease where the action
was held to be maintainable for suing out an injunction in chancery,
and that was a case decided by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
It is the case of Cox vs. Taylor's Administrators, and reported in
10 B. Monroe 17.
The leclaration in that case was adjudged insufficient, because
it did not allege that the injunction or restraining order, whereby
the plaintiff was prevented from the proper use and enjoyment
of his land, was obtained or caused to be issued or continued without any probable cause therefor. Had this allegation been in the
declaration, as it is in the one before us, it would have been sufficient.
It was argued by the defendant, that the remedy, by an action on
the case, was merged in that on the bond which is given on obtaining an injunction. In reply to this, the court said, that although a bond was given, on obtaining the injunction, that an action
upon it, and on the case, are not coextensive or commensurate,
either as to the nature of the wrong, or as to the extent or criterion
of damages recoverable, and. therefore there was no ground for this
argument, and the court likened it to a case of official bonds by
sheriffs or others, both remedies would exist, and thought the same
should be the case with regard to injuries occasioned by injunctions
VoL. Xi.-35
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for which the party might have an action on the case, if no bond
were required.
This is the only case we have been able to find going near to
sustaining this action. It is a solitary case-it stands alone, and
that fact is some evidence that it is out of the track of wellreceived judicial decisions. On the principle that this action is
not to be encouraged, it seems surprising such a decision should
have been made, especially where the injured party had a more
efficient remedy, and in pursuing which, he would not be required
to show a want of probable cause.
We hold the remedy on the bond given on obtaining the injunction, is all the remedy to which the injured party can resort. It
is designed by the statute, to cover all damages the party enjoined
can possibly sustain, and it is in the power of the judge or officer
granting the writ to require a bond in a penalty sufficient to cover
all conceivable damages. This bond is a high security which the
law requires the compiainant in a bill for an injunction to execute,
to indemnify the defendant, in case the injunction shall be dissolved. It is a familiar principle, when a party has taken a higher
security, his suit must be brought on that security. Toussaint vs.
Martinnant, 2 T. R. 104; Cutler vs. Powell, 6 Id. 324. The
bond becomes, when forfeifed, the cause of action, and is intended
by .the law, to measure the damages of every kind which the party
may sustain by wrongfully suing out the injunction in case it is
dissolved. It is not at all like the official bonds of sheriffs. They
are made payable to the people of the State, not to any particular
person, and consequently, do not merge a remedy one may have
outside of the bond, and besides, it is the policy of the law to multiply the remedies against public officers. Not so with the .injunction-bond, that is made payable to the defendant. He is the only
person interested in it. It is his security. It is all the law gives
him as his security, and he is bound to sue on the bond. Were no
bond given or required, then the action might lie. This action on
the case, under the circumstances shown, cannot and ought not to
be maintained. It is against public policy. For these reasons,
the judgment is reversed.
Judgment reversed.

GORTON vs. BROWN.
For the foregoing case we are indebted
to the courtesy of Hon. E. Peck, the reporter. Wercgard the question involved
us one of considerable praotical importance.
L It has been regarded as long settled in the English courts of equity, that
the suffering party, by reason of the
operation of an injunction out of chancery, had no redress by means of an
ordinary action upon the case. -His
only legitimate redress was upon the
bond, or what is the English practice,
a deposit of money by way of indemnification, if any was required by the
judge issuing the injunction. The English courts of equity do not allow costs
to the party against whom an injunction
had improvidently issued, upon its dissolution, where the party obtaining the
injunction had fully stated his case, so
!hat the error in granting the injunction
might .fairly be said to be .that of the
ut
court and not the fault of the party.
where the applicant for an injunction
fails to maintain the facts upon which
it is granted, he becomes liable to costs,
and these may be awarded, as between
Illingworth vs.
attorney and client.
Manchester and Leeds Railway Co., 2
Railw. Cas. 187. The Lord Chancellor,
COITEXSA4, said, "'Isthe evil which
has arisen from the injunction having
been made, and the expense of having
it discharged, to be attributed to the
error of the court, or to the false representation of the case by the plaintiffs?
Certainly the latter. The costs -were
therefore properly given to the defendants." And if the party obtain an injunction upon one state of facts, he
cannot, upon failing to prove tha, fall
back upon another which is proved, and
which, if it had been alleged, might
have equally entitled him to the injunction. But in such cases costs are sometimes denied. Greenhalgh ws. Manch.
and R. Railw., 1 Raiw. Cas.68; Attor-

ney-General vs. Mayor of Liverpool, 1
Myl. & Cr. 171-210. And it was recently held in an important case, where
the question was elaborately examined,
that the party obtaining an injunction,
and giving bonds in such sum as the
court ordered to indemnify the other
party against consequential damages, in
the event of the suit failing, could not
be amerced in damages beyond the
amount of the penalty of the bond.
Sturges vs. Knapp, 33 Vt. Rep. 486.
It was here held, that if the court, in
granting the injunction, specially order
that the party praying for it, shall respond in damages to the party against
whom it is granted, to the full extent
sustained by him, then it is competent
for the Court of Chancery to estimate
the same, by reference to a master, or
in any other proper mode, and the same
may be recovered by the party to whom
they are awarded, by an action at law.
In Garcie vs. Sheldon, 3 Barbour 232,
the court held a different view upon this
.point, maintaining that the party sustaining damages bad no remedy to recoTer the same unless upon a bond ordered
by the court for his indemnity. See
also Hall vs. Fisher, 20 Barbour 441.
It seems to be agreed on all hands
that where there is no order for the payment of damages, and no bond required,
there can be no recovery in any form.
Lexington and Ohio Railroad Co. rs.
Applegate, 8 Dana R. 289. This subject
is discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Bein rs. Heath, 12 Howard U. S. Rep. 168.
IT. But upon principle we do itot perceive why any of the cases to which we
have referred deny redress, where an
injunction is obtained upon a state of
facts known by the party obtaining it to
be false in material particulars, and
where there was no probable cause for
the proceeding, and this well understood by the party moving it, and where
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the thing was moved by mere malice.
This is ordinarily a good foundation for
an action for malicious suit, and it d-,es
not appear from the decided cases, that
it is important that the malicious suit
should be by an arrest of the body of
the defendant. But if that were required, we should regard the duress
produced by an injunction out of chancery as fully equivalent. We had occa.-ion to examine the cases upon this

general question very extensively in the
case of Barron v8. Mason, 31 Vermont
R. 189. From this examination we
should incline to believe that the decision in Cox vs. Taylor's Administrator,
10 B. 'Mon. 17, is entirely well founded
in principle, but that in practice no
such actions have been instituted, as the
courts of equity are entirely competent
to deal with offenders of this character
I. F. R.
in a summary way.

Court of Appeals of New,York.
ELIAS W.

GROSS

et al.

vs. JOSHUA G. BEARD.

The owner of a vessel is entitled to recover against one who has chartered it or
shipped goods on it, for unreasonable and improper delay in unloading the
cargo, by which such owner has been for a time unjustly deprived of the use
of his vessel, or suffered other damage.
It is usual in charter-parties to insert an agreement that a specified time shall be
allowed for loading and unloading, and that it shall be lawful for the freighter
to detain the vessel for those purposes a further specified time on payment of a
daily sum. And where the contract is thus precise, the shipper of the freight
is held strictly to its terms; and accidental delay, such as stormy weather,
prohibition of export, &c., though arising from no fault of his, will not excuse
him from payment of the demurrage.
But where no period of delay is fixed by the contract, the rule is different. There
a reasonable time is implied, and this is to be determined upon in view of all
the circumstances legitimately bearing upon the case, and is a question for a
jury.

Opinion of the Court by
DENIo, C. J.-The Supreme Court was plainly right in holding
that the owner of a vessel is entitled to recover against one who
has chartered it, or has shipped goods on board of it, for an unreasonable and improper delay in unloading the cargo by which
such owner has been for a time unjustly deprived of the use of his
ship, or has otherwise suffered damage. The thorough examination which that question has received at the hands of our learned
brother who prepared the opinion of the Supreme Court, appears
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to have convinced the plaintiff's counsel, for the contrary position
is not asserted in the printed argument submitted upon this appeal,
although the point is understood to have been taken on the motion
for a nonsuit made at the trial. Although there was not in the
agreement for carrying these goods any stipulation as to the time to
be allowed for discharging them at their port of destination, they were
consigned to the defendant by his own agents, and he was as much
bound to receive them within such time and in such a manner as not
to embarrass or damage the plaintiffs in the enjoyment of the use of
their vessel, as the plaintiffs were to carry the cargo safely to the port
to which it was consigned. In every contract between two parties,
where the performance by one of them presupposes and requires
some act to be done by the other party prior thereto, or contemporaneously, the neglect or refusal to perform such act not only dispenses with the obligation which the other was under to perform
on his part, but, where the circumstances are such, that, as in this
case, a rescission of the contract will not afford an adequate remedy
to the party who was ready to perform, he is entitled to a recompense against the delinquent party equal to the damage which such
delinquency has caused him. This principle has often been applied
to cases where the owner or shipper of goods has failed promptly
to receive them at the port of delivery so as to restore the vessel
to the general use of the owner in a reasonable time. The following authorities, most of which are commented on in the opinion
of the Supreme Court, either expressly affirm the principle, or,
taking it for granted, apply it to the solution of other questions. Abbott on Shipping 304 ; Eorn vs. Beizsusen, 9 Carr..& P. 709 ; .vane
vs. Foster, 1 Barn. & Ad. 118; Broanchervs. Scott, 4 Taunt. 1 ;
Rodgers vs. Forrester, 2 Camp. 483 ; Burniester vs. Hodgson, Id.
488 ; Htill vs. Idle, 4 Id. 327 ; Clendaniel vs. Tackerman, 17 Barb.
184. But the question presented by this appeal requires a consideration of the excuses which the shipper of goods or the charterer of a vessel may set up to excuse a delay in discharging the
cargo ; and upon this part of the case I think there is a distinction
which has been overlooked by the Supreme Court. It is usual in
charter-parties to insert an agreement that a specified number of
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days shall be allowed for loading and unloading, or for one of those
operations, and that it shall be lawful for the freighter to detain the
vessel for those purposes a further specified time on payment of
a daily sum (Abbott 303). A contract to the same effect is often
inserted in the bill of lading, when goods are sent in a general
ship: Harmon vs. Gandolphe, Holt's N. P. 95. This delay and the
payment agreed upon are called demurrage. Where the contract
is thus precise, the shipper of the freight is held strictly to its
terms. Thus, a municipal regulation of the port prohibiting intercourse for a limited period, by means of which there was a delay
in loading, a delay occasioned by frost, or by the prohibition of a
foreign government to export the stipulated cargo, or by customhouse restraints, or by unlawful seizure of some part of the cargo,
do not relieve the shipper from payment of demurrage. The merchant, as Lord ELLENBOROUGH says in speaking of this subject, is
the adventurer who chslks out the voyage: Barker vs. Hodgson, 3
M. & C. 267, Abbott 310. But the rule is somewhat different
when no period of delay is fixed by the contract. There, a reasonable time is implied, and this is to be determined upon by a regard
to all the circumstances legitimately bearing upon the case ; and it
is a question for the jury. Thus, in Randall vs. Lync1h, 2 Campb.
352, forty days for loading and unloading were allowed by the
terms of the charter-party, and also 51. per day for the next ten
days of delay. Owing to the crowded state of the London docks,
the ship was detained beyond the forty days. Lord ELLENBOROUGHI
said that a person who hires a vessel detains her, if, at the end of
the stipulated time, he does not restore her to the owner. lie
added that he was responsible for all the various vicissitudes which
prevent him from doing so. And he further said that he considered
the dock company the defendant's agents, and that the defendant
was as much responsible for a delay arising from the want of a
berth as if it had arisen from tempestuous weather or any other
cause. It is obvious that this and the other similar cases are based
upon a consideration that the shipper, by fixing upon a number of
days of delay, becomes the insurer against casualties of the kind
mentioned, which may prevent the loading or unloading within the
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specified time. He is not guilty of a breach of contract, however,
if the vessel is detained a longer period than the days specified.
lie simply pays the additional sum according to the contract. The
case is very different where there is no express contract, or, what
is the same thing, if no particular period of delay is bargained for
in the contract. In such cases the defendant is not charged for
the payment of a sum pursuant to the terms of a contract, but for
general damages for the breach of his implied agreement. This
involves a greater or less degree of delinquency, and it would therefore be unreasonable to hold the defendant responsible if he were
able to show that it was in no respect his fault that there was a,
delay in loading or unloading the vessel. The cases establish the
existence of this rational distinction. In the case of Randall vs.
Lynch, we have just seen that a delay arising from the crowded
state of the London docks was charged upon the charterer of the
vessel, the charter-party having specifically fixed upon forty days
for the time of loading and unloading, which was'exceeded for the
reason mentioned. Shortly afterwards, the case of 1?odgjers vs.
Porresfer was tried before the same Judge. It was covenant on a
charter-party for demurrage ; the contract provided that the said
freighter should be allowed the usual and customary time to unload
the said ship or vessel at her port of discharge. The vessel was
compelled to wait from the last day of August until, the 20th of
October, on account of the crowded state of the London docks,
before the plaintiff could commence the unloading, and the cargo
was not fully discharged until the 26th of that month. The defendant's counsel relied on Bandall vs. Lynch,.where the same
excuse was held to be of no avail in a case in which a specified
delay had been inserted in the charter-party. Lord ELLENDOROUGII
took the precise distinction I have suggested. In that case (Randall vs. Lynch), he said a specified period of forty days was fixed
by the charter-party for loading and unloading the cargo. Here
the stipulation is that the freighter shall be allowed the usual and
customary time to unload the ship in her port of discharge. What
is the usual and customary time for a ship to unload a cargo of
wine in the port of London? According to the evidence, when
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the ship gets a berth by rotation, and the wines can be discharged
into the bonded warehouses. I am therefore of opinion that the
defendant has not broken the implied covenant arising from the
terms of the charter-party to unload the ship in the usual and customary time for that purpose, at her port of discharge. At a later
period of the same year, the case of Burniester vs. llodgson (supra)
came on to be tried before Sir JAMES MANSFrELD, Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas. The defendant was the consignee of a cargo
of brandy brought to London in a ship of which the plaintiff was
master, but as the London docks were extremely crowded, sixtythree days elapsed before she could be unloaded. The action was
for compensation in the nature of demurrage from the time when
she might have been unloaded till she was completely discharged.
There appears not to have been any express contract as to the time
,of unloading. The Chief Justice was of opinion that the case
could not be distinguished from the case of Roodgers vs. Forrester.
lIere;he said, the law could only raise an implied promise to do
what was there stipulated for by express covenant, viz., to discharge
the ship in the usual and customary time for unloading such a
cargo. That has been rightly held to be the time within which a
vessel can be unloaded in her turn into the bonded warehouse.
I am of opinion that the present case falls within the reason of the
two visi prius cases last mentioned, and that the doctrine which
they establish is reasonable and just in itself. If it be conceded
that the defendant had a rigtit to require that the coals should be
delivered upon his own dock, he was guilty of no fault or breach
of contract in delaying the plaintiff's vessel until she could come
up to the dock by taking her turn among the other vessels which
were also waiting to be discharged, unless he was guilty bf some
fault in suffering such an accumulation of craft laden with coal for
himself, for the same wharf, at the same time. The evidence which
:he defendant offered respecting the storm on the lake was adapted
to that point, and I think it should have been received. It certainly sometimes happens that a crowd of vessels arrive at a marine
or lake port very near each other, owing to their having been held
back by a storm or by adver-.e winds. Whether, if that was the
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case in this instance, the defendant should be considered in fault,
in not providing means for unloading a greater number of vessels
at one time, or whether, under the actual circumstances, he ought
to have engaged another wharf to receive the coal, were questions
for the jury to determine. But it was a material feature of the case
for the defendant to show, if he could, that it was not owing to any
mismangement of his or of his agents or correspondents, that so
many vessels were at the port laden with his property, and ready
to be discharged at the same time. That, it seems to me, be
offered to do, but the evidence was ruled out. We think the judgment should be reversed, on account of this error, and that a new
trial should be awarded. We not perceive any error in the denial
of the motion for a nonsuit, because, in our view of the law, there
were still questions for the jury to pass upon. namely, those which
have just been mentioned.

Supreme Court of IYew Jersey.
IRAXNDALL & MORELL VS. ROCHE & CREEDE.'

1. The vessel lien law of this State applies as well to foreign as to domestic
vessels.
2. A lien for supplies furnished to a foreign vessel, on the credit of the owner or
the mwIter, does not create a maritime lien on the vessel. vithin the jurisdiction
of the U'nitd States Courts of Admiralty, anmt may be elloreed il the Courts
of this Statte.

This was a tdemurrer to certain pleas, the particulars cf which
sufficiently appear in the opinion delivered.
I.

'. &ud.lcr, for plaintiffs.

ril'.hri.st, for the defendants.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
ELm., J.-The action in this case is upon a band g''en under
I We tire indeb'.el for this case to the courtesy of A. Dutcher, Esq., Peporter
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the 12th section of the Act entitled "An Act for the collectior
of demands against ships, steamboats, and other vessels:" Nix.
Dig. (3d ed.), 529.
The pleas demurred to, aver in substance, that the vessel in
question, called the "Pope Catlin," was a foreign vessel enrolled
in the State of New York, and owned by Roche, one of the
defendants, the master of said vessel, and another person, both
of whom resided in New York and not in New Jersey. It was
insisted by the counsel for the defendants that the Act above referred to does not apply to such vessels ; and if it does, that so
far as it purports to give a lien for supplies furnished to a vessel
engaged in commerce and navigation between different States, it
is in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States,
which give exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and maritime causes
to the Courts of the United States.
The terms of the act certainly include all descriptions of vessels, and however impolitic such lien laws may be justly regarded,
they are at present evidently much in favor with those who control
our State legislation, and whether wise or unwise, must be enforced
according to their true intention by our Courts. The act is copied
from the New York law, where it has always been regarded as
applying to foreign vessels. Indeed, for many years only such
i'essels were affected by it: 17 Johns. R. 54; 1 Wend. 557; 5
Hill 34; 3 Selden 508. Similar laws exist in many of the Eastern and Western States.
In regard to the conflict of jurisdiction, none of the pleas show
that the lien sought to be enforced was within the jurisdiction of
the admiralty. The debt was contracted by Roche, the master of
the vessel, and the pleas show that he was also one of the owners.
By the maritime law of this country, where a master obtains supplies in a foreign port (and a port in a different State from that in
which the vessel is owned, is, for this purpose, held to be a foreign
port), which are necessary to enable the vessel to proceed, it is
presumed that he makes the contract on the credit of the vessel,
and there is a lien which will be enforced by the Admiralty
Courts; but if the supplies were obtained by an owner or part
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owner, or if the master obtains them on his own credit, they are
not liens: The Virgin, 8 Peters 538; Thomas vs. Osborn, 19
How. 22.
It will not be necessary in this case to decide whether a proper
maritime lien can be enforced in any other mode than by a proceeding in admiialty, and in view of the difficulties which beset
the whole subject, and the diversity of opinion which has hitherto
prevailed among the judges of the Supreme Court of the United'
States, it is best to express no opinion. See Jaekson vs. Steamboat .1agnolia, 20 How. '393, and Taylor vs. Caryl, 20 How. 583.
But if it be admitted that the State Courts have no jurisdiction in
such a case, to divest the State Courts it must be clearly shown
that the lien in, question was of that description. The facts stated
raise no such presumption, nor is it averred in. terms that the lien
was one that came within the jurisdiction of the admiralty.
Judge STORY, in the case of the Bark Chusan, 2 Story Rep.
401, has made some observations, which would seem to imply that
he considered the New York statute would be unconstitutional, if
applied to a foreign vessel. Judge NELSoN, however, in the case
of The Globe, 2 Blatch. C. C. R. 430, takes a different view of it,
and treats it as creating a good lien. He notices SToRY's remark,
and says, "But this remark was made in answer to the argument
that the statute controlled the jurisdiction of the admiralty, and
in that view the statute would have been unconstitutional."
Chief Justice WATKINs, in the case of Merrick vs. Avery, 14
Ark. 378, gives an able opinion on the lien law of Arkansas, and
remarks correctly, I think, that the beneficial qperation of that
law was to extend the privilege of the maritime lien upon seagoing vessels, for their building or equipment in domestic ports,
just as that lien existed in Europe and would have prevailed in
England, and so descended to this country, but for the jealousy
of the common law.
It was urged by counsel, that the provision in the Coistitution
of the United States, giving to Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, would
exclu(de this lIen from State cognisance. Much of the difficulty
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on the subject probably has arisen from confounding t'is clause
with that giving jurisdiction to the Federal Courts in admiraliv.
If the legislative power given to Congress to regulate commerce
had been held to be exclusive, as is perhaps the better opinion, it
would have covered the whole case, and no State Legislature could
create a new maritime lien, or in any way interfere with foreign
commerce-or commerce between the States. Such, however, is not
the doctrine of the Supreme Court. That Court holds the power
over commerce to be, so far as it is exercised, paramount to State
legislation ; but the power of the State remains in other eascs tintouched, so that what Congress has not regulated each Stnte may
regulate for itself, within its own territory. As the constitution
is now construed, Congress may declare what debts shall be liens
on foreign vessels, and that no others sh:zll be, and thus render
maritime liens uniform throughout the Union - and it will prob:ably
-not be long before it. will be found indispensable to do this. Large
foreign ships are now. liable to be seized by attachments and other
State process in such manner as may seriously embarrass coinmerce. But, until this is done, the State may create new liens on
vessels and enforce them.
Wlhat are properly admiralty and maritime causes, it has been
found very difficult to define, and cannot be said yet to be definitely settled. In its nature, however, the admiralty jurisdiction
is exclusive. But it is jurisdiction over admiralty causes, and not
jurisdiction over all causes afieting foreign vessels, or over all liens
on such. At one time the Admiralty Courts enforced liens exclusively of State creation. a practice now abandoned as untenable :
Allen vs. Neirberrff, 20 How. 245; 3tlau'ire vs. Card, 21 Id. 248.
If a cause does not belong to the Admiralty Courts, they Cannot interfere. When it does, the States cannot abridge or in any
way control it. In all cases the common law remedies remain, and
may be resorted to in the State Courts. What is a comfion la w
remedy, and how far the State laws may chiange the course of proceeding. are difficult questions I ,hall not now examine. A debt
coustitimim a maritime lien may be collected by a cumsmniou law
remedy, but admiralty proceedings cannot be intituted ia State

